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PD CLC/TR 50126-2:2007

Superseded

Superseded

A superseded Standard is one, which is fully replaced by another Standard, which is a new edition of the same Standard.

View Superseded by

Railway applications. The specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for safety

Available format(s)

Hardcopy , PDF

Superseded date

30-11-2017

Superseded by

BS EN 50126-2:2017

Language(s)

English

Published date

30-04-2007

$669.38
Including GST where applicable

Introduction
1 Scope
2 References
3 Definitions and abbreviations
  3.1 Guidance on the interpretation of terms and definitions
      used in EN 50126-1
  3.2 Additional safety terms
  3.3 Abbreviations
4 Guidance on bodies/entities involved and concepts of system
  hierarchy and safety
  4.1 Introduction
  4.2 Bodies/entities involved in a system
  4.3 Concepts of system hierarchy
      4.3.1 Rail transport system environment and system hierarchy
  4.4 Safety concepts
      4.4.1 Hazard perspective
      4.4.2 Risk
      4.4.3 Risk normalising
5 Generic risk model for a typical railway system and check
  list of common functional hazards
  5.1 Introduction
  5.2 Generic risk model
  5.3 Risk assessment process
      5.3.1 Introduction
      5.3.2 Generic process
  5.4 Application of the risk assessment process
      5.4.1 Depth of analysis
      5.4.2 Preliminary hazard analysis
      5.4.3 Qualitative and Quantitative assessment
      5.4.4 Use of historical data
      5.4.5 Sensitivity analysis
      5.4.6 Risk assessment during life cycle phases
  5.5 Check-list of common functional hazards and hazard
      identification
      5.5.1 Introduction
      5.5.2 Hazard grouping structures
      5.5.3 Check-list of 'Hazards'
6 Guidance on application of functional safety, functional
  safety requirements and SI targets, risk apportionment and
  application of SILs
  6.1 Introduction
  6.2 Functional and technical safety
      6.2.1 System characteristics
      6.2.2 Railway system structure and safety requirements
      6.2.3 Safety related functional and technical
            characteristics and overall system safety
6.3 General considerations for risk apportionment
      6.3.1 Introduction
      6.3.2 Approaches to apportionment of safety targets
      6.3.3 Use of THRs
  6.4 Guidance on the concept of SI and the application of SILs
      6.4.1 Safety integrity
      6.4.2 Using SI concept in the specification of safety
            requirements
      6.4.3 Link between THR and SIL
      6.4.4 Controlling random failures and systematic faults
            to achieve SI
      6.4.5 Use and misuse of SILs
  6.5 Guidance on fail-safe systems
      6.5.1 Fail-safe concept
      6.5.2 Designing fail-safe systems
7 Guidance on methods for combining probabilistic and deterministic
  means for safety demonstration
  7.1 Safety demonstration
      7.1.1 Introduction
      7.1.2 Detailed guidance on safety demonstration approaches
      7.1.3 Safety qualification tests
  7.2 Deterministic methods
  7.3 Probabilistic methods
  7.4 Combining deterministic and probabilistic methods
  7.5 Methods for mechanical and mixed (mechatronic) systems
8 Guidance on the risk acceptance principles
  8.1 Guidance on the application of the risk acceptance principles
      8.1.1 Application of risk acceptance principles
      8.1.2 The ALARP principle
      8.1.3 The GAMAB (GAME) principle
      8.1.4 Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM) safety principle
            (EN 50126-1, Clause D.3)
9 Guidance on the essentials for documented evidence or proof
  of safety (Safety case)
  9.1 Introduction
  9.2 Safety case purpose
  9.3 Safety case scope
  9.4 Safety case levels
  9.5 Safety case phases
  9.6 Safety case structure
  9.7 Safety assessment
      9.7.1 The scope of the safety assessor
      9.7.2 The independence of a safety assessor
      9.7.3 Competence of the safety assessor
  9.8 Interfacing with existing systems
      9.8.1 Systems developed according to the EN 50126-1 process
      9.8.2 System proven in use
      9.8.3 Unproven systems
  9.9 Criteria for cross acceptance of systems
      9.9.1 The basic premise
      9.9.2 The framework
Annex A (informative) Steps of risk assessment process
      A.1 System definition
      A.2 Hazard identification
          A.2.1 Empirical hazard identification
          A.2.2 Creative hazard identification
          A.2.3 Foreseeable accident identification
          A.2.4 Hazards
      A.3 Hazard log
      A.4 Consequence analysis
      A.5 Hazard control
      A.6 Risk ranking
          A.6.1 Qualitative ranking
          A.6.2 Semi-quantitative ranking approach
Annex B (informative) Railway system level HAZARDs - Check lists
      B.1 General
      B.2 Example of hazard grouping according to affected persons
          B.2.1 'C-hazards' - Neighbours group
          B.2.2 'C-hazards' - Passengers group
          B.2.3 'C-hazards' - Workers group
      B.3 Example of functional based hazard grouping
Annex C (informative) Approaches for classification of risk
        categories
      C.1 Functional breakdown approach (a)
      C.2 Installation (constituent) based breakdown approach (b)
      C.3 Hazard based breakdown approach (c)
      C.4 Hazard causes based breakdown approach (d)
      C.5 Breakdown by types of accidents (e)
Annex D (informative) An illustrative railway system risk model
        developed for railways in UK
      D.1 Building a risk model
      D.2 Illustrative example of a risk model for UK railways
          D.2.1 Modelling technology
          D.2.2 Usage and constraints
          D.2.3 Model forecasts
Annex E (informative) Techniques & methods
      E.1 General
      E.2 Rapid ranking analysis
      E.3 Structured What-if analysis
      E.4 HAZOP
      E.5 State transition diagrams
      E.6 Message Sequence Diagrams
      E.7 Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis - FMECA
      E.8 Event tree analysis
      E.9 Fault tree analysis
      E.10 Risk graph method
      E.11 Other analysis techniques
           E.11.1 Formal methods analysis
           E.11.2 Markov analysis
           E.11.3 Petri networks
           E.11.4 Cause consequence diagrams
      E.12 Guidance on deterministic and probabilistic methods
           E.12.1 Deterministic methods and approach
           E.12.2 Probabilistic methods and approach
      E.13 Selection of tools & methods
Annex F (informative) Diagramatic illustration of availability
        concept
Annex G (informative) Examples of setting risk acceptance
        criteria
      G.1 Example of ALARP application
      G.2 Copenhagen Metro
Annex H (informative) Examples of safety case outlines
      H.1 Rolling stock
      H.2 Signalling
      H.3 Infrastructure
Bibliography

Presents guidance on specific issues for applying the safety process requirements in EN 50126-1 to a railway system and for dealing with the safety activities during the different system life cycle phases.

Committee
GEL/9
DocumentType
Standard
Pages
134
PublisherName
British Standards Institution
Status
Superseded
SupersededBy

Standards Relationship
CLC/TR 50126-2:2007 Identical

IEC 61025:2006 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
EN 50128:2011/AC:2014 RAILWAY APPLICATIONS - COMMUNICATION, SIGNALLING AND PROCESSING SYSTEMS - SOFTWARE FOR RAILWAY CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS
IEC 60812:2006 Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
IEC 61160:2005 Design review
IEC 61078:2016 Reliability block diagrams
IEC 61165:2006 Application of Markov techniques
EN 60300-3-1:2004 Dependability management - Part 3-1: Application guide - Analysis techniques for dependability - Guide on methodology
EN 61078 : 1991 RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAMS (IEC 61078:2016)
DEFSTAN 00-56(PT2)/3(2004) : INTERIM SAFETY MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENCE SYSTEMS - PART 2: GUIDANCE ON ESTABLISHING A MEANS OF COMPLYING WITH PART 1
ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014 Safety aspects — Guidelines for their inclusion in standards
MIL-HDBK-764 Base Document:1990 System Safety Engineering Design guide for Army Materiel
CLC/TR 50126-3:2008 RAILWAY APPLICATIONS - THE SPECIFICATION AND DEMONSTRATION OF RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY AND SAFETY (RAMS) - PART 3: GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF EN 50126-1 FOR ROLLING STOCK RAM
IEC 60300-3-1:2003 Dependability management - Part 3-1: Application guide - Analysis techniques for dependability - Guide on methodology
EN 50129 : 2003 COR 2010 RAILWAY APPLICATIONS - COMMUNICATION, SIGNALLING AND PROCESSING SYSTEMS - SAFETY RELATED ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS FOR SIGNALLING
IEC 61703:2016 Mathematical expressions for reliability, availability, maintainability and maintenance support terms
EN 50126-1:2017 Railway Applications - The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) - Part 1: Generic RAMS Process
IEC 60300-3-9:1995 Dependability management - Part 3: Application guide - Section 9: Risk analysis of technological systems
EN 61160:2005 Design review
EN 61703:2016 Mathematical expressions for reliability, availability, maintainability and maintenance support terms

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